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1. Introduction1 
Statistical disclosure control (SDC) was not created in a single seminal paper nor 
following the invention of a new mathematical technique, rather it developed slowly in 
response to the practical challenges faced by data practitioners based at national 
statistical institutes (NSIs). SDC’s subsequent emergence as a specialised academic 
field was an outcome of three interrelated socio-technical changes: (i) the advent of 
accessible computing as a research tool in the 1980s meant that it became possible - 
and then increasingly easy - for researchers to process larger quantities of data 
automatically; this naturally increased demand for such data; (ii) it became possible 
for data holders to process and disseminate detailed data as digital files and (iii) the 
number of organisations holding data about individuals proliferated. This also meant 
the number of potential adversaries with the resources to attack any given dataset 
increased exponentially. 
In the remainder of this article, we will describe the state of the art for SDC and then 
discuss the core issues and future challenges. First though, we want to clarify the 
distinction between SDC and two other terms which are often incorrectly interchanged 
with it: anonymisation and privacy. 
1.1 SDC and anonymisation 
Anonymisation is a process whereby personal data is transformed into non-personal 
data (also then often referred to as “anonymised data”). Anonymisation is especially 
attractive because provisions and restrictions on the processing of personal data by 
the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (and other laws which regulate of data 
processing) do not apply to anonymous data. 
SDC methods are used as part of anonymisation processes. They attempt to 
control/limit the risk of re-identification and attribute disclosure (see Section 2.1.1) 
through manipulations of the data. However, anonymisation processes involve more 
than just SDC. Firstly, approaches such as privacy models can be considered as 
alternative anonymisation processes – and, secondly, any fully functional 
anonymisation process must also consider things such as context, provenance, 
external communications and impact (because risk is not just about probability). 
                                                 
1 Acknowledgement: Some of the material in this document is drawn from other work by the authors 
(open access publications, research proposals etc.). The authors thank the co-authors of those sources 
Jennifer Taub, Joe Sakshaug, Elaine Mackey, Duncan Smith and Dave Martin) for consenting to this 
re-use. 
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Therefore SDC is just one of the tools in the anonymiser’s toolbox; it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for functional anonymisation but it is extremely useful [1].  
1.2 Disclosure control is not privacy 
The word privacy is a much abused and hugely contested term, and an important 
distinction should be made between confidentiality (which concerns data) and privacy 
(which concerns people) [2]. This is not the appropriate place for philosophical 
discussion [3], but it is important to realise that SDC (and indeed all processes which 
attempt to manipulate disclosure risks) are primarily technical confidentiality processes 
which only indirectly and imperfectly map onto privacy protections.  
The key point is that one should not assume that one has adequately protected privacy 
by controlling disclosure. Even the so called “privacy models” (which we will discuss 
later) do not achieve this. To fully account for privacy concerns there is a need to 
ethically audit the data processing much more deeply and thoroughly than what is 
required for even well-formed disclosure control. It is true that disclosure control may 
have a positive impact on privacy, but that impact is a secondary by-product of its 
primary role as a confidentiality process. SDC is, and can only be, a mechanism for 
meeting confidentiality assurances.   
We will use the term privacy sparingly in this article. We will mainly do so where we 
refer to the work of others who have used the term to avoid confusing the reader. For 
example, we will not rename “differential privacy” and will use the term “privacy 
guarantee” despite believing these terms to be misnomers. However, the reader 
should note that the term “privacy” is in effect standing in for “confidentiality” and that 
real privacy is not in fact being discussed. 
2. The state of the art 
2.1 Basic principles 
SDC fundamentally consists of two processes: disclosure risk analysis and disclosure 
control. Controlling the disclosure risk must be done in a way that optimises the trade-
off between risk and utility. While risk must be kept below the maximum acceptable 
threshold (set by law or by good practices), utility must be kept above the minimum 
threshold that data users can accept. Without utility constraints, there would be no 
reason to control disclosure: one might rather suppress the data entirely, which would 
result in 0% disclosure risk!  
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2.1.1 Attribution and identification 
There are two main risks of disclosure that need to be controlled: 
• Attribute disclosure occurs when the intruder is able to estimate the value of a 
confidential attribute for a certain subject. Note that some parts of the literature 
distinguish between attribute and inferential disclosure (with the former 
absolute, and the latter probabilistic) but we consider this to be a false 
distinction as all such disclosures are moderated by error processes.  
• Re-identification disclosure occurs when an intruder can determine the identity 
of the subject to whom a record or a data item corresponds. 
2.1.2 Input vs output SDC 
Another key distinction is between input and output disclosure control. Input disclosure 
control is control placed on the data before it is analysed (or even seen by an analyst). 
Output SDC places controls on analytical outputs. Formally, output SDC is most 
commonly used in situations such as research data laboratories where it is possible 
to control risk through environmental controls and thereby allow access. We shall have 
more to say about output disclosure control later as there are some issues with it that 
need attention; for the remainder of this section however we will focus on input SDC. 
2.2 Controlling disclosure risk: ex-post vs privacy models 
The traditional approach to anonymisation, still dominant among statistical agencies, 
controls disclosure risk ex-post: an SDC method with a heuristic parameter choice and 
with suitable utility preservation properties is run on the data and, after that, the risk of 
disclosure is measured2. 
For example, the risk of re-identification can be estimated empirically by attempting 
record linkage between the original and the anonymised datasets [4], or analytically, 
by using generic measures [5, 6] or measures tailored to a specific anonymisation 
method [7]. If the remaining risk is deemed too high, the anonymisation method must 
be re-run with more stringent parameters or a further method applied (probably with 
more utility sacrifice). 
                                                 
2 Procedurally, it is an iteration between risk assessment and control. Potentially, a risk analysis is the 
first step to determining whether controls are necessary and the extent to which they are required, but 
risk assessment must necessarily be the last step. The key point is that there is a separation of the 
steps of quantifying the risk and controlling it. 
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The alternative anonymisation approach, introduced by computer scientists, controls 
risk ex-ante and is based on the notion of privacy model, which is a condition, 
dependent on a parameter, that guarantees an upper bound on the risk of re-
identification disclosure and perhaps also on the risk of attribute disclosure by an 
intruder. The model can be enforced using one or several SDC methods whose 
parameters derive from the model parameters.  
2.2.1 Privacy models 
The first privacy model to be developed was k-anonymity [8]. It focuses on quasi-
identifier (QI) attributes, that is, on attributes that are not direct identifiers (recall that 
anonymised datasets cannot contain direct identifiers), but that in combination might 
be used to link the anonymised data with an external identified data source to re-
identify the subject to whom an anonymised record corresponds. Examples of quasi-
identifiers include Age, Profession, Gender and Zipcode. Under k-anonymity, QI 
attribute values are generalised or microaggregated (see Section 2.4.4), so that each 
combination of QI attribute values is shared by at least k records (the so-called k-
anonymous class); in this way, the risk of re-identification is at most 1/k. K-anonymity 
can either be implemented using a combination of generalisation and local 
suppression [8], or be based on microaggregation [9]. Unfortunately, k-anonymity fails 
to guard against attribute disclosure. Indeed, it can occur that the values of a 
confidential attribute (e.g. Salary) are very similar for all the records in a k-anonymous 
class; in that case, even if the intruder cannot determine the record corresponding to 
his target subject, he can obtain a good guess of the target subject’s salary.  
Extensions of k-anonymity that protect against attribute disclosure include l-diversity 
[10], t-closeness [11], (n,t)-closeness [12], crowd-blending privacy [13], -likeness [14]  
and others. 
The introduction of -differential privacy (DP) inaugurated a family of privacy models 
essentially different from k-anonymity, with the attractive feature that they make no 
assumptions about the intruder’s auxiliary knowledge (e.g. external identified data 
sources, extra knowledge about target subjects, etc.) [15]. The anonymised response 
to a query is -DP if it does not betray (up to a function of ) the presence or absence 
of any subject in the original dataset. Although DP was designed to anonymise query 
results, methods to produce DP datasets can also be found in the literature with 
proposals for applications to histograms [16], microaggregation [17], Bayesian 
networks [18] and synthetic data [19, 20].   
K-anonymity-like models and -DP should not be regarded as competing models: each 
has its strength and weakness [21, 22, 23] and indeed each can be used to boost the 
other [24]. Although DP is a prevalent approach among the academic community, 
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research on other privacy models is also needed given the diversity of requirements 
of controllers and users. 
2.3 Intruder testing 
Intruder testing (sometimes called penetration testing) is an approach to assessing 
disclosure risk more directly than the range of methods described above. Essentially, 
the tester attempts to mimic a ‘would-be’ data intruder by re-identifying units within a 
dataset. That simple description hides a complex and resource-intensive process. 
Here we just provide a brief description to intruder testing (see [1] for a more 
comprehensive description):  
There are essentially four stages to an intruder test: (i) data gathering; (ii) data 
preparation and harmonisation; (iii) the attack itself; and (iv) verification. The first stage 
tends to be the most resource-intensive and the second and third require the most 
expertise.  
Data gathering involves going out to the world and gathering information on particular 
individuals. Exactly what that will look like will depend on the nature of the scenario 
tested but would typically involve at least some searching of the Internet. For example, 
one intruder test in the literature gathered information on 100 individuals, taking about 
three person-months of effort [25]. This test also included a second augmented attack 
using data purchased from the commercial data broker CACI [25].  
Once the data gathering phase is complete, the data have to be harmonised with the 
target dataset. This will require work both across all the data, and at the level of 
individual records, as in all likelihood there will be several issues to be addressed to 
achieve this. For example, gathered data will often be coded differently from the target 
data; the tester might have gathered information about somebody’s job from social 
media, but how exactly would that be coded in the target dataset? There will also be 
data divergence within the gathered information.  
Some scenarios simulate linkage between an identification dataset and a target 
dataset, rather than between gathered data and a target dataset. In this case no data 
gathering is needed but data harmonisation will still usually be required and issues of 
data divergence still be critical, although the focus will tend to be on the dataset as a 
whole rather than upon individual records. 
The details of the attack stage will also depend on the nature of the data and the 
intrusion scenario, but typically it will involve attempting to link the information gathered 
at stage (i) to the tester’s dataset. Usually this will involve a mixture of automated and 
manual processes. In essence the aim is to establish negative and positive evidence 
for links between the attack information and records in the dataset. 
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A second point to note is that no match has 100% confidence associated with it. This 
reflects the reality that we can never be completely certain that we are correct. There 
is always a possibility that (i) the dataset contains data for a person who is highly 
similar to our target – their statistical twin – or that (ii) the assumption that our target is 
in the data is incorrect. It is worth noting in passing that this is the flipside of not being 
able to reduce the risk to zero. 
Finally, once the matches have been selected, they need to be verified. This will often 
be carried out by a different person or organisation than the person doing the 
matching. If the matcher is carrying it out – at the risk of stating the obvious – they 
should only do this once they have decided upon their final list of matches. 
As mentioned above intruder testing done properly is resource-intensive – it can be 
very informative but is recommended only for new data situations where the calibration 
of statistical disclosure risk measures is difficult to achieve [1]. 
2.4 SDC methods 
SDC methods can be classified depending on the data format to which they are 
applied. We will distinguish three main data formats: tables, database query outputs 
and microdata. 
2.4.1 SDC methods for tables 
Methods to control disclosure in tables can be classified as:  
• Non-perturbative. They do not modify the values in the cells, but they may 
suppress or recode them. Best known methods: cell suppression (CS) and 
recoding of categorical attributes. Cell suppression has a long tradition in 
national statistical offices: a sensitivity rule (for example, the dominance rule or 
the p% rule) is used to identify cells that are sensitive; these sensitive cells are 
suppressed (primary suppressions) and then another set of cells (called 
secondary suppressions) is identified and suppressed to prevent inferring the 
primary suppressions from table marginals. 
• Perturbative. They modify the values in the cells. Best known methods: 
controlled rounding (CR) and controlled tabular adjustment (CTA). These 
methods also rely on identifying sensitive cells, but they have the advantage of 
yielding a protected table without missing cells. Their shortcoming is that the 
reported cell values may not correspond to the true cell values. 
More details on those tabular SDC methods, and the τ-Argus [27] package for 
implementations of them, can be found in the literature [26].  
 11 
 
2.4.2 SDC methods for database query outputs 
There are two main SDC principles for queryable database protection:  
• Query perturbation. Perturbation (noise addition) can be applied to the 
microdata records on which queries are computed (input perturbation) or to the 
query result after computing it on the original data (output perturbation). 
Differential privacy (see Section 2.1.1) was initially proposed as an output 
perturbation method for query outputs.  
• Query restriction. The database refuses to answer certain queries. A common 
criterion to decide whether a query can be answered is the query set size: the 
answer to a query is refused if this query together with the previously answered 
ones isolates too small a set of records. The main problems of query restriction 
are: i) the computational burden to keep track of previous queries; ii) collusion 
attacks can circumvent the query limit. The issue of trackers - a sequence of 
queries to an on-line statistical database whose answers disclose the attribute 
values for a small subgroup of individual target records or even a single record 
- is well known [28]. It has been demonstrated that building a tracker is feasible 
and not resource-intensive for any subgroup of target records [29].  
2.4.3 SDC methods for microdata  
A microdata file X with s respondents and t attributes is an s × t matrix where Xij is the 
value of attribute j for respondent i. Attributes can be numerical (e.g. Age, Blood 
Pressure) or categorical (e.g. Gender, Job). Depending on their disclosure potential, 
attributes can be classified as:  
• Identifiers. Attributes that unambiguously identify the respondent (e.g. Passport 
Number, Social Security Number, Name-Surname, etc.).  
• Quasi-identifiers or key attributes. They identify the respondent with some 
ambiguity, but their combination may lead to unambiguous identification (e.g. 
Address, Gender, Age, Landline Telephone Number, etc.).  
• Confidential outcome attributes. They contain sensitive respondent information 
(e.g. Salary, Religion, Diagnosis, etc.).  
• Non-confidential outcome attributes. Other attributes which contain non-
sensitive respondent info.  
Identifiers are of course suppressed in anonymised datasets. Disclosure risk comes 
from quasi-identifiers (QIs), but these cannot be suppressed because they often have 
high analytical value. Indeed, QIs can be used to link anonymised records to external 
non-anonymous databases (with identifiers) that contain the same or similar QIs; this 
leads to re-identification. Hence, anonymisation procedures must deal with QIs.  
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There are two principles used in microdata protection, data masking and data 
synthesis:  
• Masking generates a modified version X′ of the original microdata set X, and it 
can be perturbative masking (X′ is a perturbed version of the original microdata 
set X) or non-perturbative masking (X′ is obtained from X by partial 
suppressions or reduction of detail, yet the data in X′ are still true).  
• Synthesis is about generating synthetic (i.e. artificial) data X′ that preserve 
some pre-selected properties of the original data X.  
2.4.4 Perturbative masking 
The main principles for this class of masking are:  
• Noise addition. This principle is only applicable to numerical microdata. The 
most popular method consists of adding to each record in the dataset a noise 
vector drawn from a N(0,αΣ), with Σ being the covariance matrix of the original 
data. Means and correlations of original data can be preserved in the masked 
data by choosing the appropriate α. Additional linear transformations of the 
masked data can be made to ensure that the sample covariance matrix of the 
masked attributes is an unbiased estimator for Σ.  
• Microaggregation. Microaggregation partitions records in a dataset into groups 
containing each at least k records; then the average record of each group is 
published [30]. Groups are formed by the criterion of maximum within-group 
similarity: the more similar the records in a group, the less information loss is 
incurred when replacing them by the average record. There exist 
microaggregation methods for numerical and also categorical microdata [9, 31].  
• Data swapping. Values of attributes are exchanged among individual records, 
so that low-order frequency counts or marginals are maintained. Although 
swapping was proposed for categorical attributes, its rank swapping variant is 
also applicable to numerical attributes. In the latter, values of each attribute are 
ranked in ascending order and each value is swapped with another ranked 
value randomly chosen within a restricted range (e.g. the ranks of two swapped 
values cannot differ by more than p% of the total number of records).  
• Post-randomisation. The PRAM method works on categorical attributes [32]: 
each value of a confidential attribute is stochastically changed to a different 
value according to a prescribed Markov matrix.  
2.4.5 Non-perturbative masking 
Principles used in this kind of masking include:  
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• Sampling. Instead of publishing the original data file, only a sample of it is 
published. A low sampling fraction may suffice to anonymise categorical data 
(the probability that a sample unique is also a population unique is low). For 
continuous data, sampling alone does not suffice.  
• Generalisation. This principle is also known as coarsening or global recoding. 
For a categorical attribute, several categories are combined to form new (less 
specific) categories; for a numerical attribute, numerical values are replaced by 
intervals (discretisation).  
• Top/bottom coding. Values above/ below, a certain threshold are lumped into a 
single top/ bottom, category respectively.  
• Local suppression. Certain values of individual attributes are suppressed in 
order to increase the set of records agreeing on a combination of quasi-
identifier attributes. This principle can be combined with generalisation.  
2.5 Data synthesis  
Data synthesis is sometimes viewed as an SDC method and sometimes as an 
alternative to SDC. This is mostly a semantic concern, but it is true that synthesis has 
some functional properties different from those of other SDC methods. Yet, the goal is 
the same: to release a useful dataset whilst maintaining data subject confidentiality. 
The concept of synthetic data was first introduced by Donald Rubin, who proposed 
multiply imputing a whole dataset, so that no real microdata would be released [33]. 
Soon after, Rob Little proposed an alternative where only the sensitive variables were 
synthesised, referred to as partially synthetic data [34]. Since fully synthetic data does 
not contain any original data, the disclosure of sensitive information from the synthetic 
data is much less likely to occur. Likewise, for partially synthetic data, the sensitive 
values are synthetic, and thus disclosure of sensitive information is also less likely to 
occur compared to the original data. Nonetheless, in the (in principle unlikely) event 
that some or all of the synthetic records are very similar to certain original records, re-
identification or attribute disclosure may de facto occur. In this situation, there is little 
chance that the affected subjects will be satisfied by the argument that the data are 
synthetic and therefore do not denote them. Therefore, it remains good practice to 
assess disclosure risk for synthetic data before release as one would for masked data 
[35].  
Special care must be devoted to make sure synthetic data yield valid statistical 
analyses. Validity is important since synthetic data can be used to study policy-
relevant outcomes and inform policy decisions; for example, the US Census Bureau 
released a synthetic version of the Longitudinal Business Database [36, 37] and in 
Germany a synthetic version of the IAB Establishment Panel has been released [38, 
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39]. Both of these datasets provide relevant information on businesses in their 
respective countries, and the quality of these data are of great importance to data 
users. If the synthetic data produces results that are distorted, incorrect economic 
conclusions could be drawn. It has been argued that the validity of synthetic data is 
dependent on the models used to generate them and will not reflect relationships that 
are present in the original data but not represented in the data generation model [40]. 
Furthermore, if the distributional assumptions built into the model are incorrect, then 
these incorrect assumptions will also be built into the user’s analysis models. The 
importance of this issue is exacerbated by the fact that the vast majority of utility tests 
for synthetic data are not necessarily representative of the work that data analysts 
intend to undertake. The other side of the coin is that, if too accurate a model is used 
for synthesis (what is called model overfit), then the resulting synthetic values may be 
too similar to certain original values, which may result in disclosure (see previous 
paragraph). 
The initial proposal for producing synthetic data was based on multiple imputation (MI) 
techniques using parametric modelling. Originally, MI was created in the 1970s as a 
solution to deal with missing data by replacing missing values with multiple values, to 
account for the uncertainty of the imputed values.  
Recent research has examined non-parametric methods - including machine learning 
techniques - which are better at capturing non-linear relationships for generating 
synthetic data [41]. These methods include classification and regression tress (CART) 
[42], random forests [43], bagging [41], support vector machines [44], and genetic 
algorithms [45]. CART, originally developed as a non-parametric modelling tool based 
on decision trees [46, 47], has become the most commonly used non-parametric 
method for generating synthetic data. For example, CART was used to generate 
synthetic data for some of the variables in the US Longitudinal Business Database 
[48].  
To generate synthetic data from a CART model, each variable is fitted to a tree that 
splits into branches based on a series of binary splits [42]. These branches continue 
to divide until they terminate in leaves. The values in the terminal leaf represent the 
distribution of the predicted variable. The synthetic data is then generated by sampling 
from the leaves. Previous work found that when comparing different methods of 
machine learning for synthetic data generation, CART yielded the highest data utility 
[49]. They tested the utility by comparing distributions of different variables and 
coefficient estimates from a fitted logistic regression model. Likewise, a utility 
comparison of different tree-based synthetic datasets against a parametric synthetic 
dataset found that CART performed better than other tree-based synthetic data 
approaches, but not as well as the parametric method [50]. This was determined by 
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comparing coefficient estimates from a linear regression, a logistic regression, and 
Poisson regression. Previous studies tend to be limited in their assessment of data 
utility in that they typically choose only a limited number of analytical models and 
outcomes, and additionally they tend to analyse said models using a single metric (e.g. 
confidence intervals).  
CART synthetic data was originally designed under a multiple imputation framework, 
and the utility of this framework has been evaluated in other work [50, 51]. However, 
given that CART creates synthetic data using a different ethos from parametrically 
multiply imputed data, it has many advantages including that CART models (i) are 
more easily applied especially to non-smooth continuous data, and (ii) provide a semi-
automatic way to fit the most important relationships in the data.  
2.6 Measuring utility and its loss  
As justified in the introduction to this article, measuring the utility of SDC-protected 
data is an integral part of disclosure control. Utility measurement is difficult because in 
many cases there is no clarity about what the users of data will want to do with those 
data. There is a distinction between information loss, which attempts to capture in 
information-theoretic terms of the change in information caused by disclosure control, 
and utility measurement, which attempts to get as close as possible to the actual use 
case for the data. The distinction between the two is not clear-cut and here we refer 
to utility loss as an overarching term for all such methods.  
2.6.1 Utility evaluation in tabular SDC  
For cell suppression, utility loss can be measured as the number or the pooled 
magnitude of secondary suppressions. For CTA or CR, it can be measured as the sum 
of distances between true and perturbed cells. The above loss measures can be 
weighted by cell costs if not all cells have the same importance3. 
2.6.2 Utility evaluation in SDC of database queries 
For query perturbation, the difference between the true query response and the 
perturbed query response is a measure of utility loss; this can be characterised in 
terms of the mean and variance of the added noise (ideally the mean should be zero 
                                                 
3 As to disclosure risk, it is normally evaluated by computing feasibility intervals for the sensitive cells 
(via linear programming constrained by the marginals). The table is said to be safe if the feasibility 
interval for any sensitive cell contains the protection interval previously defined for that cell by the data 
protector. 
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and the variance small). For query restriction, utility loss can be measured as the 
number of refused queries.  
2.6.3 Utility evaluation in microdata SDC 
Utility loss in disclosure-controlled microdata can be evaluated using either data use-
specific loss measures or generic loss measures. The former evaluates the extent to 
which SDC affects the output of particular analyses [52]. Often, the data protector has 
no idea regarding what the users will do with the data; if this is so then generic utility 
loss measures - that measure the impact of SDC on a collection of basic statistics 
(means, covariances, correlations etc. [53]) or that rely on some score (such as 
propensity scores [54]) - can be used. The most general methods measure the 
distance between the original and disclosure-controlled data using measures such as 
Jensen Shannon divergence [55]. These, however have issues when dealing with data 
sparsity.  
In general, our understanding of data utility is less well developed than our 
understanding of disclosure risk. One particular issue is that all of the above measures 
of utility are relative measures; that is, they (attempt to) measure the utility of the data 
compared with the original data. This sets the original data up as an operational gold 
standard – which is at best a proxy measure and may be completely unrealistic. A 50% 
reduction in utility may be completely fine if the original data utility was very high and 
may render the data effectively useless if the original data utility was low. Relatedly, 
the original data will usually be subject to multiple error processes which clearly impact 
on their underlying utility. Therefore, in short, we need to better understand what data 
utility is in and of itself; arriving at such a general theory of data utility would be 
extremely beneficial for the field.  
3. Issues arising 
Most of the issues that arise in what might be called the ‘standard SDC model’ are due 
to the rapid and ongoing change in the global socio-technical system. Specific reasons 
are the exponential increase in available data as well as a less rapid but nevertheless 
consistent increase in our capacity and resources to process that data in new, 
imaginative and valuable ways.  
3.1 Understanding the data environment 
The term “data environment” semi-formalises the notion of the context in which data 
sits [56]. Underlying all of this is the relationship between the data in this environment 
and the data that is the focus of a potential release or share. Many authors have 
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commented that this environment is inherently difficult - if not impossible - to 
understand and therefore directly assessing risk is itself impossible. This in turn has 
led to bad decision making about data sharing (a strange mixture of over-caution and 
imprudence which is driven more often than not by the personality of the decision 
maker rather than by rational processes). 
3.1.1 Data Environment Analysis 
The presupposition of the Data Environment Analysis is that data that are held in 
private databases are a key source of uncertainty in the SDC process [56]. However, 
the instruments (e.g. loyalty card applications, service registrations, social media 
platform sign ups) that are used to collect these data are usually available on the web 
in electronic form. Data Environment Analysis was developed at the University of 
Manchester and works by collecting these instruments manually and adding them to 
a metadata repository. This repository is in turn used to generate the empirically 
grounded key variable patterns that are needed to perform risk assessments. Although 
the repository does not contain records, it does enable the possibilities for linkage to 
be identified, because it creates a synthetic data environment in an accessible form, 
thereby allowing the simulation of intruders who combine multiple (public and private) 
data sources together to produce attack vectors. 
3.2 The use of multiple data sources 
The increasing diversity of datasets within the global data environment has thrown up 
another opportunity for analysts to perform the linkage or matching of data to allow 
more comprehensive analyses. There are numerous processes which fall under this 
heading, but the paradigmatic ones are record linkage and statistical matching.  
The goal of record linkage is to identify pairs of records (a, b) from databases A and B 
that relate to the same population units. The classical method for linking records is 
based on a Bayesian latent model and uses comparisons for equality on the key 
variables [57] (variables common to A and B). The basic output of a linkage exercise 
is a set of link probabilities, one for each (a, b) pair. 
The goal of statistical matching is to generate a database of records over the union of 
the variables in A and B –with no general expectation that merged pairs of records 
correspond to identical population units [58]. The basic output is a list of plausible full 
records and weights. The full records are constructed by merging record pairs that are 
‘similar’ on the key variables. The results of record linkage or statistical matching might 
be used for subsequent analysis.  
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Recent developments have, to some degree, blurred the distinction between record 
linkage and statistical matching. Using similarities on the key variables can 
significantly improve linkage performance [59]. Simultaneously estimating the joint 
distribution over all the variables (essentially, the goal of statistical matching) has also 
produced improvements in record linkage performance [60]. 
The use of linked administrative data for empirical, and particularly policy-oriented, 
research has increased steadily in recent decades [61, 62]. There are at least two 
factors driving this trend: 1) a desire to use more detailed and up-to-date data to inform 
policy and practice; and 2) a gradual change in the political and data infrastructure 
landscape to facilitate access to record-level data. While linking and expanding access 
to these data undoubtedly increases scientific research opportunities and facilitates 
the study of complex policy-oriented research questions, both factors present 
methodological and data confidentiality issues that have not been fully worked out. 
From a confidentiality perspective, the re-use of administrative records for research 
purposes poses strong risks because they tend to capture whole populations, often 
contain sensitive data, and consent of the data subjects has not and - pragmatically - 
could not be obtained. These risks increase further when the data are linked. For these 
reasons, access to such data is normally restricted to Approved Researchers working 
within secure laboratory environments with linkage carried out by trusted third parties 
(TTPs - organisations that facilitate linkage between data owned by different 
organisations that cannot share data with one another). The secure laboratory model 
described above was originally designed for single datasets and the output disclosure 
methods have been designed with that in mind. 
3.3 The informal nature of output SDC 
There has been a lot of research on input SDC covering risk assessment, risk control 
methods and the measurement of information loss. However, output SDC is under-
researched. The methods employed are based on a small number of arbitrary heuristic 
rules such as the threshold rule. These tend to be informally justified only through a 
“test of time” assertion. Formal evaluation and testing of these rules seem overdue. 
A specific and unexplored issue for output disclosure concerns the situation where the 
input data are a set of linked records. Where data from multiple owners is combined 
using a TTP or similar mechanism there is now a possibility that one of the data owners 
may be able to re-identify units within any given analytical output. Owners will have 
strong knowledge about which data units will be represented in any given output and 
knowledge about the specific values for those units in respect of the data that they 
have contributed. This represents quite a strong adversary; at present no work has 
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been done to assess this particular risk. In general, risk assessment for output SDC 
needs to be put on a more formal footing. 
4. The future of SDC 
4.1 Measuring attribute/inferential disclosure 
As mentioned in Section 2, statistical disclosure arises out of attribution and 
identification. Despite this, SDC as a field has focused heavily on the re-identification 
risk, an oddity that has given little attention to the attribute disclosure risk.  
Two methods that have been developed are the SAP method for tables of counts [63] 
and the CAP method for microdata [64]. The premise of SAP is that formally a table of 
counts is disclosive if an intruder who has information about some (>0) population 
units included in the table can potentially create a zero by removing the known units. 
The SAP metric is parametrised by the amount of information that the intruder is 
assumed to have and the output is a probability that an intruder with that amount of 
information will recover a zero. The CAP method on the other hand assumes that the 
intruder knows some information about an individual who is (or indeed is not) 
contained within some microdata. 
More work needs to be done to explore attribute disclosure.  
4.2 SDC and big data 
Thus far we have avoided the use of the term big data. This is partly because it is a 
buzzword with no agreed meaning and partly because it is a bit of a semantic bucket 
into which a people happily toss all manner of socio-technical changes which might be 
more aptly described and better understood on their own. From a SDC point of view 
much of what is meant by “big data” can be captured by the opening paragraphs of 
this article: a set of socio-technical changes that transform the scale, use, meaning 
and value of data. However, the key point is that we have reached a phase in this 
process where we cannot deal with this by doing more of the same. Challenges to 
protect big data against disclosure and to protect data (big or small) in the context of 
big data include: 
• Unjustified de facto trust in controllers. Twenty years ago, national statistical 
institutes (NSIs) and a few others were the only data controllers that were 
explicitly gathering data on the citizens, and their legal status made them 
trusted. In contrast, in the current big data scenario, there is a host of controllers 
gathering and processing information, and it is no longer reasonable to take it 
for granted that the subject trusts all of them to keep her data confidential and/or 
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anonymise them properly in case of release [65]. Thus, to preserve her 
confidentiality and, more generally, her informational self-determination, the 
subject has to be empowered by giving her agency over her own data. Local 
anonymisation gives maximum agency to the subject. However, it is ill-suited 
for privacy models that rely on hiding the subject’s record in a group of records, 
such as k-anonymity and its extensions, because those methods necessitate 
the clustering of the contributions of several data subjects. If we obviate this 
difficulty and want to pursue local anonymisation, randomised response and 
local DP are natural approaches. Unfortunately, the current literature on both 
approaches focuses on obtaining statistics on the data from subjects, rather 
than multi-dimensional full sets of anonymised microdata that are valid for 
exploratory analysis.  
• Anonymised data are difficult to merge and explore. Even if subjects decide to 
accept centralised anonymisation by the controllers, none of the main families 
of privacy models manages to satisfy all the desiderata of big data 
anonymisation identified [66]: (i) protection against disclosure no matter the 
amount of background information available to the intruder; (ii) utility of the 
anonymised microdata for exploratory analyses; (iii) linkability of records 
corresponding to the same or similar individuals across several anonymised 
datasets; (iv) composability, that is, preservation of privacy guarantees after 
repeated application of the model or linkage of anonymised datasets; and (v) 
low computational cost. Utility and linkability are needed to empower users/data 
analysts, protection and composability are desired by subjects, and low cost is 
desired by controllers. On the other hand, it is hard for controllers holding 
datasets to engage in joint exploratory analysis of their data without disclosing 
these to other controllers. Note that cryptographic secure multiparty 
computation (MPC) [67] is of little use here, because it is intended for specific 
calculations planned in advance rather than exploratory analyses. Furthermore, 
while MPC ensures input confidentiality, it gives exact outputs and cannot 
protect against disclosure by inference (e.g. if the mean and the variance of a 
sample are jointly computed and the variance is very small, it can be inferred 
that the values of all subjects lie close to the mean). 
• Ad-hoc SDC methods. In the current state of the art, each privacy model is 
satisfied using a specific SDC method (or a few specific ones). For example, k-
anonymity is reached via generalisation or microaggregation, and DP via noise 
addition. Life would be easier if a unified masking approach existed that, under 
proper parameterisation, could be used with a broad range of privacy models. 
• Stream data and real-time analytics. The potential of streaming analytics for 
research, policy analytics and business is huge; it is potentially a game 
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changer. However, the additional confidentiality issues raised by streamed data 
are significant. This again is a relatively uncharted area. Work done with 
mobility data  indicates one possible direction [68, 69], but given the likely 
importance of streaming data, the need for focused research in this area is 
urgent. 
• Radical linkability. In the context of a data environment in which data fragments 
about population units abound, sometimes referred to the data soup [70], 
traditional record linkage probably needs reformulating. A more flexible concept 
of entity resolution is coming to fore [71, 72, 73, 74] and the use of graphical 
and clustering-based approaches is being investigated [75, 76]. Some focused 
thinking about what risk means in this context is needed. It seems likely that 
there is an opportunity here as well as new risks, as these types of advanced 
linkage processes can be used as risk measurement instruments [77].     
4.3 SDC and machine learning  
The term “machine learning” has numerous definitions and has migrated in meaning 
since its original use [78]. A current consensus would probably form around a definition 
such as a computational system which improves its performance on some task 
(involving the processing of data) by the (partially or fully automated) processing of 
feedback about that performance. The boundary between machine learning and 
statistics is fuzzy but it is certainly true that many data analysts now use machine 
learning tools as well as more orthodox statistical ones.  
There is a two-way relationship between SDC and machine learning: 
• On the one hand, SDC must preserve sufficient utility in the masked data for 
these to be still useful for machine learning, as well as knowledge extraction 
and exploratory analyses. This is especially necessary if SDC is applied to big 
data. The requirements here are subtly different from those needed for 
inferential statistics – the utility required to train a model may differ from that 
required to apply that model. 
• On the other hand, machine learning in a broad sense can be useful for SDC. 
At present this is an underexplored area. In the rest of this section, we discuss 
the specific potential of machine learning in synthetic data generation.  
4.3.1 Data synthesis using machine learning 
The classical goal of machine learning is to build models and make predictions based 
on discovered patterns in data. In principle, this maps well onto the goals of data 
synthesis where, paradigmatically, the synthetic data is one draw from a posterior 
distribution generated using the original data. Recently, there have been attempts to 
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synthesise data using deep learning techniques such as generative networks across 
a range of data types for example medical records [79], sensor data [80] and computed 
tomography images [81]. The results are certainly interesting; however, although they 
have recognised “privacy” concerns, they are not at present focused on the SDC use 
case.  
Within the SDC framework, a machine learning approach to synthetic data generation 
using genetic algorithms has been developed which shows much promise [45, 55, 79].  
Traditional methods for synthetic data production aim to produce some model of the 
original dataset, and then uses that model to generate the data. This can be viewed 
as selecting from the (very large) space of possible datasets one that is consistent 
with the model. This might be contrasted with the application of SDC methods which 
could be viewed as an operator to move through the space (away from the original 
data). GA approaches generate synthetic data by similarly moving through the space. 
However, whereas with SDC the movement is a by-product of the operator and one 
needs a completely different method (risk and utility test) to assess if one has arrived 
at a good enough place, GA data synthesis is explicitly goal-directed.  
The advantages of the GA approach are twofold: (i) it allows optimising utility and 
disclosure risk within a single system (rather than having to face the choice between 
favouring utility and controlling risk ex-post on the one side, or limiting risk ex-ante with 
a privacy model on the other side) and (ii) rather than the generation process being 
based on a single model, one can optimise across a (in principle unlimited) basket of 
required analytical properties.  
The initial GA population (set of candidate datasets) is typically either randomly 
generated or drawn from univariate distributions. One interesting feature, though, is 
that if one instead uses copies of the original data for the initial population then the 
problem looks like a classic SDC problem (where the utility is initially optimised but the 
risk is too high). This underlines the point that the boundary between data synthesis 
and SDC may be more of form than substance [34].  
4.4 Frameworks to unify SDC  
SDC has been so far characterised by a great diversity of masking methods, disclosure 
risk assessment approaches and privacy models. This makes it hard to compare the 
various approaches being proposed. Quite recently, there have been unifying efforts. 
We mention next: i) the permutation model and the maximum-knowledge intruder; and 
ii) differential confidentiality for synthetic data generation. 
 23 
 
4.4.1 Unifying SDC: The permutation model and the maximum-knowledge 
intruder 
A permutation model of anonymisation has been proposed, which shows that any 
masking algorithm can be viewed as a permutation of the original data plus a small 
amount of noise [83]. Thus, any masking can be basically modelled as permutation, 
and checking whether the amount of masking is sufficient for protection reduces to 
checking whether permutation is sufficient. This can be useful to provide 
anonymisation transparency, to define new privacy models and to measure risk and 
utility in a more unified way. 
Using the permutation model, a worst-case intruder model with the so-called 
maximum-knowledge intruder who knows the entire original dataset and the entire 
anonymised dataset has been introduced [83]. His objective is to discover the correct 
linkage between original and anonymised records, that is, to discover the permutation 
that basically turns the original dataset into the anonymised dataset. Such an intruder 
is stronger than any intruder in the literature: since he knows the original dataset, 
external background knowledge is as irrelevant to him as it is in -differential privacy. 
His motivation is purely malicious, e.g. to tarnish the data controller’s reputation. An 
open research avenue is to investigate how successful such an intruder can be at 
finding the linkage and verifying its correctness depending on the information he is 
given on the anonymisation method. 
4.4.2 Differential confidentiality 
A concept of differential confidentiality in the context of synthetic data generation which 
draws on the attribute or inference disclosure metric CAP described in Section 4.1  has 
been recently developed [64]. The question posed is: does the presence of a particular 
population unit in the original dataset allow stronger (higher probability) inferences to 
an intruder with any given prior knowledge about that unit than if the unit was not in 
the original dataset? The method allows the measurement of information leakage in a 
synthetic dataset. The method could also be applied to disclosure-controlled data. 
4.5 SDC and anti-discrimination 
Data mining is gaining societal momentum due to the ever-increasing availability of 
large amounts of human data, easily collected by a variety of sensing technologies. 
There are unprecedented opportunities and risks: a deeper understanding of human 
behaviour and how our society works is darkened by a greater chance of privacy 
intrusion and unfair discrimination. The individuals whose data are published may 
suffer discrimination in decisions made on them if data mining models (e.g. classifiers) 
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are trained on data that are biased against certain protected groups (ethnicity, gender, 
political preferences, etc.).  
Fortunately, it has been shown that a synergy exists between confidentiality protection 
and anti-discrimination protection. A methodology has been outlined [84] to obtain 
datasets for publication that are: i) confidentiality-preserving, that is, anonymised; ii) 
unbiased regarding discrimination; and iii) as useful as possible for learning models 
and finding patterns. The approach to simultaneously achieve confidentiality 
preservation and discrimination prevention uses generalisation as an SDC method. It 
turns out that the impact on the quality of data is the same or only slightly higher than 
the impact of achieving just confidentiality preservation. 
If the above combines confidentiality preservation and discrimination prevention for 
data publication, the same can be achieved with knowledge extraction [85]. Consider 
the case in which a set of patterns extracted from the personal data of a population of 
individual persons is released for a subsequent use in a decision-making process such 
as granting or denying credit. First, the set of patterns may reveal sensitive information 
about individual persons in the training population and, second, decision rules based 
on such patterns may lead to unfair discrimination, depending on what is represented 
in the training cases. This describes a set of pattern sanitisation methods, one for each 
discrimination measure used in the legal literature, to achieve a fair publishing of 
frequent patterns in combination with two possible data transformations: one based 
on k-anonymity and one based on differential privacy. The proposed pattern 
sanitisation methods based on k-anonymity yield both confidentiality and 
discrimination-protected patterns, while introducing reasonable (controlled) pattern 
distortion. Moreover, they obtain a better trade-off between protection and data quality 
than the sanitisation methods based on differential privacy [85]. 
4.6 Local and collaborative approaches to SDC 
Local anonymisation is an alternative paradigm in which each subject anonymises her 
own data before handing them to the data controller, who therefore does not need to 
be trusted. Several SDC methods can be applied locally (including 
generalisation/recoding and noise addition). On the other hand, there are methods 
specifically designed for local anonymisation that, in addition to helping subjects hide 
their responses, allow the data controller to get an accurate estimation of the 
distribution of responses for groups of subjects (for example, randomised response 
[86] and FRAPP [87]). There are also a number of methods aimed at obtaining 
differentially private preselected statistics through local anonymisation, like RAPPOR 
[88] and local DP [89, 90]. 
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For privacy models relying on hiding subjects in a group (such as k-anonymity and its 
extensions l-diversity, t-closeness and others), local anonymisation is not suitable: 
forming clusters requires some collaboration between subjects. Rational 
anonymisation collaboration is sustainable due to the game-theoretic notion of co-
utility that characterises situations in which the best strategy to attain one’s goal is to 
aid others in attaining theirs [91]. Privacy is a public good that is naturally co-utile, in 
the sense that: the more private stay the people among whom I hide, the more private 
I stay. Specifically, in microdata data anonymisation via clustering, the confidentiality 
of a subject in a cluster depends on the confidentiality of the rest of subjects in the 
cluster: none of the subjects is interested in making any of the other subjects re-
identifiable. Co-utility leads to protocols that work smoothly without external enforcing 
mechanisms.  
A naïve co-utile collaborative anonymisation protocol has been given to achieve k-
anonymity [92]: in step 1, subjects share the values of their QIs (that are not 
confidential) so that any of them can compute and publish clusters of k subjects based 
on their QIs; in step 2, subjects use anonymous channels to send the values of their 
confidential attributes together with the number of the cluster where they ought to be 
placed. In this way, a k-anonymous dataset is collaboratively obtained. Further 
research is needed to deal with malicious behaviours of subjects aimed at framing a 
target subject in order to learn the latter’s confidential data (for example, by fabricating 
k-1 false subjects with QI values similar to the ones of the target subject). 
4.7 Linkage-synthesis models 
The combination of record linkage and synthesis is an intriguing methodological 
possibility that has yet to be explored beyond conjecture [93]. There are numerous 
potential avenues that might be researched within this framework (including a 
mechanism for multi-source linkage) but a key potential use case is a methodology for 
linkage which circumnavigates the need for using TTPs (using direct identifiers).  
Suppose that Alice owns dataset A (containing set of variables {WX}) and Bob owns 
dataset B (containing set of variables {YZ}) which may, or may not, contain units from 
A. Both Alice and Bob have access to C ({XY}) – say a census microdata file.  
C can be used to enable Alice to produce a partially synthetic dataset consisting of the 
original A with synthesised values Y’. Y’ could then be passed to Bob who could link it 
against the real records in dataset B. Y’ would then be passed back to Alice with a 
serial identifier (ID) attached denoting the real record in B that best matched each 
synthetic record in Y’. This would be iterated multiple times. Alice could then identify 
from the information that Bob has returned the ID in B that is most frequently hit for 
each record in A (“the optimum links set”), which would be the presumed link. The 
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process could also then be reversed with Bob synthesising and sending a synthetic X’ 
to Alice, and Alice sending back IDs linked to that X’.  
If we imagine that Alice and Bob are actually the data scientists working for data 
holding organisations and a researcher wants to analyse the combination of AB, then 
the net result of the above process would be a set of linked IDs which could be sent 
to a researcher (or research data centre) who could then be sent the two datasets 
which could then be linked. The key point is that at no point in this process have the 
direct identifiers for the data subjects been shared with a third party (trusted or not).   
There would be complex meta-issues to be resolved (e.g. contradictions in the A->B 
and B->A links and many-to-one links) but these issues also represent leverage on 
identifying the correct links. Thus, this represents a complex and interesting, but 
directly applicable, research problem.  
Another extension of this approach is where the goal of the process is not to produce 
a set of links but rather to use the process as a mechanism for enhancing the dataset 
owned by each party with a synthetic version of the data owned by the other party 
(which would be better than any synthetic data they could have produced without the 
mechanism). One simple option to explore is to assume that, for a given record in A, 
multiple imputation from the optimum link set will produce better results than multiple 
imputation using A and C only. 
4.8 Automated data environment mapping 
The difficulty with the current approach to data environment analysis (described in 
Section 3) is the time it takes to identify collection instruments and manually enter the 
metadata into the repository. This makes the approach non-viable for any realistic data 
dissemination activity with the possible exception of the Census (the methodology 
actually arose from the 2011 UK Census). Currently, each collection instrument is 
added to the repository as a list of variables and categorisation mappings (using 
standardised variable / category names that match those in the relevant ontology). 
The ontology is a graph that describes the relationships between the categories of a 
variable.  
In order to generate a large repository that will provide a reasonable representation of 
the data environment that would have wide usability (and perhaps even more 
challenging to update that repository in near real time), the process must be 
automated. This would require several computational processes which mix Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) and web science: 
1. Information retrieval – crawling the web to identify data collection 
instruments. 
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2. Text mining – identifying the variables on the collection instruments and their 
categorisations. 
3. Ontology generation – identifying the relationships between categories so 
that matching possibilities can be identified. 
This is at a pre-theoretical stage at present; pilot work needs to be carried out in order 
to justify the significant R&D investment required for producing the new system (and 
then ongoing resources to maintain such a system). 
Textual information from collection instruments will need to be mapped to variables. 
For each variable instance encountered, the categories need to be mapped to the 
ontology that describes the relationships between the (previously encountered) 
categories of the variable. New variables/categories need to be identified so that the 
repository/relevant ontology can be updated. This would build on initial work which 
outlined the basic principles of key variable mapping [94]. 
Mapping questions to variables is a non-trivial natural language processing problem. 
A question and a set of possible responses do not necessarily map to a single variable 
(e.g. a 'General Health' question listing diseases where the respondent can select zero 
or more diseases from which they suffer). Even if the mapping is 1 to 1 there might be 
an additional category that is implied by not selecting any of the possible responses 
('Are you X?', with a single tick box). 
Iteratively constructing an ontology is also non-trivial. Inconsistencies between a new 
categorisation and an existing ontology are easily identified from the graph structure. 
Resolving the inconsistencies might involve correcting a mapping (a collection 
instrument might have an implied category that has not been recognised) or correcting 
the ontology and any previously added variable instances (e.g. the first variable 
instance added, where the ontology would be created from the set of identified 
categories, but the categories might not have been exhaustive). Inevitably there will 
be some cases that need to be flagged for human intervention. In order to be feasible, 
the proposed system requires that the proportion of cases where human intervention 
is required be low. This is what the proposed work seeks to demonstrate. 
Information will be retrieved for easily identified and parsed collection instruments (say 
limited to HTML with <form> tags). These will be used to build a corpus of forms 
(collection instruments). A set of variables will be identified, and classifiers used to 
generate (probabilistic) mappings of form data to the set of variables. Ontologies will 
be represented as graphs, with inconsistencies being identified using specific graph 
properties (these graphs are already developed). The (probabilistic) mappings for 
variables and categories and the degrees of inconsistency with existing ontologies will 
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be used to guide decisions (update ontology and add variable instance or flag for 
human intervention). 
One approach that could be investigated is to manually classify a corpus of forms in 
order to seed the system with correct mappings and ontologies. These can be used to 
learn the classifiers. The system would then be tested against forms that were not 
used for generating the classifiers. This approach might reduce the levels of human 
intervention subsequently required. The important thing is that such intervention 
should become rarer as the size of the repository increases. 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this article we have explored the future of SDC; in this we have endeavoured to 
focus on immediate challenges and practical solutions whilst allowing ourselves some 
freedom to speculate. Given the hazardous nature of any horizon scanning activity, 
and given the aforesaid rapid pace of change, we are bound to have missed future 
possibilities and outcomes. However, we are confident that the possibilities and 
challenges that we have focused upon are potentially important and this leads us to a 
set of recommendations. 
5.1 Recommendations 
We recommend that the community should: 
1. Evolve statistical disclosure control so that it can deal with the challenges 
brought by big data, namely: 
a. Empower data subjects against the crowd of untrusted data controllers 
by developing local, collaborative and transparent SDC methods.  
b. Empower data users and controllers by developing SDC methods that 
offer disclosure protection, utility for exploratory analyses, selectable 
linkability between anonymised data sources, composability and low 
computational cost. 
c. Unify the vast array of SDC methods and privacy models, by devising 
SDC methods that can satisfy several privacy models and by defining 
utility and risk measures that are valid no matter the privacy models and 
SDC methods used.  
d. Investigate the particular challenges presented by new forms of data, 
most notably data streams. 
2. Integrate data sanitisation for privacy protection with data sanitisation for other 
purposes, such as anti-discrimination [84]. Finding synergies between different 
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types of sanitisation may incur less information loss than independently 
pursuing the various sanitisation goals on the same data. 
3. Carry out a thorough investigation of the potential for machine learning 
(including deep learning and optimisation methods) for confidentiality 
protection. This might include how to use big data to unobtrusively generate 
official statistics. Two specific cases: 
a. Pilot the possibility of producing an AI system to automate key variable 
mapping. 
b. Carry out a programme of research to enable the Government Statistical 
Service (GSS) to fully realise the potential of synthetic data. This 
research should consider synthesis methods, disclosure risk 
measurement and utility optimisation and the potential of modern AI 
techniques including deep learning. 
4. Investigate how SDC methods may be adapted to learn from the insights 
provided by differential privacy. 
5. Carry out work to formalise output disclosure risk assessment.     
As a closing remark, our overarching recommendation is that this type of horizon 
scanning activity should be carried out regularly, for identified trends to be constantly 
reviewed and for old decisions to be frequently revisited.  
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